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1 Introduction
Milk is one of the most important agricultural commod-
ities in the EU-27 and worldwide. In 2011, about one
million European dairy farmers produced 127 million
tons of milk with a value of 45 billion Euros, representing
13% of the European food and beverages industry’s turn-
over (Euromilk 2012). Dairy cooperatives account for
about 57% of the turnover in raw milk produced in the
EU-27 (Hanisch, Müller, and Rommel 2011).
Concerns about market imbalances on various levels
of the food chain have fueled a policy debate on how to
improve competition toward benefitting farmers and con-
sumers in the European Union. On the level of processing,
imbalances in competition and irregularities have been
observed, and national competition authorities have filed
numerous cases against violation of anti-trust regulations
in the dairy sector (European Competition Network 2012).
With the ongoing reform process of the European Union’s
common agricultural policy (CAP) and the abolishment of
the quota system, milk and dairy products have received
special attention. For instance, in Germany, Europe’s lar-
gest dairy producer, the national competition authority
has detected severe market imperfections, especially on
the level of processors (Bundeskartellamt 2012).
In this context, the role of cooperatives has also been
extensively discussed. The so-called theory of the
Competitive Yardstick Effect suggests that cooperatives,
because they act in the interest of farmers, secure produ-
cer prices at “fair” and efficient levels, meaning here
marginal cost (Cotterill 1987; Fousekis 2011; LeVay 1983;
Nourse 1945; Sexton 1990; Staatz 1989). In some EU
member states, these arguments have been used to justify
far-reaching exemptions for cooperatives and producer
organizations from anti-trust regulations (Hanisch and
Rommel 2012; Zoeteweij-Turhan 2012). More recently,
such exemptions have also been considered in the so-
called Milk Package (European Commission 2010).
However, some dairy-farmer organizations have also
questioned the pro-competitive effect of large coopera-
tives (Hanisch and Rommel 2012).
In spite of a renewed academic interest in imperfect
spatial competition (Graubner, Balmann, and Sexton
2011) and theoretical models which explain the yardstick
effect of cooperative pricing (Fousekis 2011; Liang and
Hendrikse 2013), empirical evidence on the effect of coop-
eratives on market balance and competitive prices is still
relatively scarce (Cazzuffi 2012; Hanisch et al. 2012;
Milford 2012; Pennerstorfer and Weiss 2013).
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In this article, we seek to address this empirical gap
using a unique data set to estimate the effect of coopera-
tive market share on farm gate milk prices for the EU-27
member states. The magnitude of this effect gives us
some indication of how far cooperatives fulfill yardstick
functions as hypothesized by theory.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
In the next sections, we provide some background on
dairy cooperatives, dairy markets, and related agricul-
tural policies. We then present the theoretical framework
of the cooperative yardstick theory. In a subsequent sec-
tion, we elaborate on our empirical approach and data.
Thereafter, we present and discuss the results. In the final
section, we draw conclusions from our findings and pre-
sent an outlook on future research.
2 Background and theoretical
framework
2.1 Cooperatives and the common agricul-
tural policy
All around the world, cooperatives process and market
large shares of the milk produced by farmers (Chaddad
2007). In the United States, cooperatives control about
83% of the dairy market (United States Department of
Agriculture 2011). In the European Union, by contrast, coop-
eratives account for about 57% of dairy turnover andmilk is
by far the most important sector in the cooperative market-
ing of agricultural produce there (Bijman et al. 2012). Table 1
displays the largest European dairy processors by turnover.
As indicated in Table 1, among the largest European
dairies, four out of ten enterprises are registered as
cooperatives. Similar to their investor-oriented firm coun-
terparts, cooperatives are very often large companies and
sometimes even global players. The growing size of coop-
erative enterprises has induced innovations in board
structures in order to (1) allow for professional manage-
ment and more flexible ways of operative decision mak-
ing and (2) attract additional equity for growth.
Professionalization and board structure changes in some
of the largest coops (e.g. DMK, Arla, FrieslandCampina)
have given rise to concerns about the producer-orienta-
tion of these large cooperatives (Hanisch and Müller
2012). This tension between producers and the increas-
ingly professionalizing management of their organiza-
tions has fuelled discussion within the EU about the
role of cooperatives for agricultural markets in general
and for their members in particular.
Since the introduction of the CAP, Europe’s dairy
sector has been subject to numerous policy changes. In
1984, milk quotas with fixed production levels at the
country level were introduced. In addition, instruments
such as price stabilization through intervention, export
subsidies, internal subsidies to increase consumption,
and private storage have been implemented since then.
With the Agenda 2000 CAP reforms, intervention prices
for butter and skimmed milk powder were reduced by
15%, and direct payments were introduced. In 2003,
intervention prices were again reduced by 10%, and the
intervention prices for butter and milk quotas were pro-
longed until 2015. Direct payments of 3.55 Euro cents/liter
were decoupled from milk production and, since then,
have become conditional on conservation and sustain-
ability requirements listed in “cross compliance” regula-
tions. In 2008, the “Health Check” came to the
conclusion that the milk quota system had to be abol-
ished. With a slow and stepwise increase of country
quotas, a soft landing for dairy farmers on the
Table 1 Top 10 European dairies by turnover
Rank Company name Country Legal form Turnover with dairy products
(in billion €) (2011)
Dairy share of total
turnover (2010) (%)
Processed milk
(in billion kg) (2010)
1 Nestlé CH IOF 18.6 19 12
2 Danone FR IOF 14.0 77 n.a.
3 Groupe Lactalis FR IOF 13.5 97 10.2
4 Friesland Campina NL Coop 9.7 98 10.3
5 Arla Foods Group DK/SE/DE Coop 9.3 100 8.7
6 Unilever NL/UK IOF 5.2* – –
7 DMK DE Coop 4.6 100 6.8
8 Sodiaal FR Coop 4.4 100 5.2
9 Bongrain FR IOF 4.0 100 3.1
10 Müller UG DE IOF 3.3 – –
Source: Adapted from Zuvielzicht/Rabobank (2012), own data; *Estimated.
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internationalizing dairy market was agreed upon. As a
consequence, milk prices have become more volatile. In a
period of extremely low milk prices in 2009, several
“emergency market interventions” were carried out.
The European Commission’s latest reform endeavors
culminated in the 2009 draft Milk Package. For the time
following the abolishment of the quota system, contrac-
tual relations between farmers and dairies, the EU-wide
promotion of bargaining organizations, and limits to firm
concentration on the basis of national market shares
(30%) or market shares in the EU (3.5%) were discussed
as means of leveling the playing field for producers and
processors (European Commission 2009). In the debate
about the objectives of EU policy reform, the role of
existing cooperatives has been sometimes praised and
sometimes questioned. We propose that several theoreti-
cal arguments can explain the high extent of cooperative
organization in the dairy sector.
Because the production of fresh milk requires long-
term initiatives in infrastructure and skills development,
dairy farmers seek to protect their investments by orga-
nizing market access. Fresh milk is a perishable and
comparatively heavy commodity, vulnerable to quality
differentials and hygiene malpractice. Consequently,
farmers benefit from collective investments in transporta-
tion, processing, and quality control. Such investments
will not pay off, however, if supply or quality constraints
prevail. From a Transaction Cost Economics perspective,
the dominance of cooperatives in dairy can be explained
by otherwise likely “holdups” in the supply chains for
perishable goods (Williamson 1981). Asset specificity of
site-specific dairy farming equipment or human-specific
skills on the farmer side and processing equipment on the
dairy side favor contractual relations with a mid-term per-
spective and partial integration of transactions by means of
“hybrid governance” (Bonus 1986; Ménard 2007). Where
cooperatives manage to provide long-term organization of
producers within regions on the basis of binding price and
delivery agreements, membership, and democratic control,
they often achieve dominance in the dairy sector. The orga-
nization of “countervailing power” (Galbraith 1952) on the
side of producers and the need to acquire a price-relevant
market position for dairies are additional objectives that
European cooperative farmers pursue.
2.2 The cooperative yardstick theory
Over the past century, there has developed an intensive
theoretical debate regarding what cooperatives do or are
supposed to do, with cooperatives often being associated
with the function of leveling the playing field in the
presence of power imbalances prevalent in agricultural
markets (LeVay 1983). In addition, since the 1980s, scho-
lars have increasingly viewed cooperatives from the per-
spective of Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson 1985,
1996). We differentiate between these two schools of
cooperative thought, which have focused on countervail-
ing power (Cotterill 1987; Nourse 1945), from a second
type which views the cooperative as an organizationally
superior “hybrid” form to organize certain rural transac-
tions, opposed to coordination via hierarchies or markets
(Bonus 1986; Ménard 2004, 2007; Valentinov 2007).
While contemporary contributions focus on the orga-
nization and dynamics of cooperative development
(Chaddad 2007; Cook 1995; Cook and Iliopoulos 1999;
Hansmann 1996; Ménard 2007; Nilsson 1999), classical
theorists have mostly looked at single functions which
cooperatives fulfill in the development of the overall
economic system (Cotterill 1984; Marshall 1890 [1920];
Pigou 1924, 1920; Walras 1865). One function often attrib-
uted to cooperative enterprises is vertical integration into
upstream or downstream positions of the supply chain and
provision of higher margins and “fair pricing” for member-
owners in a situation where structural imbalances would
otherwise prevail (Royer 1995; Sexton 1986). Apart from
the role cooperatives play in fair-trade, specialty, and
organic segments of agricultural markets concentrating
on particular product characteristics (Bacon 2005; Levi
and Linton 2003), the question arises of how cooperatives
manage to provide “fair pricing” to their members for bulk
types of agricultural commodities.
A particularly interesting approach for explaining the
function of cooperative enterprises where markets are
riddled by structural imbalances is the competitive yard-
stick theory. Inspired by Chamberlin’s (1933) seminal
work on monopolistic competition, Shleifer (1985) devel-
oped a model of price control, based on inter-firm com-
parisons for public service industries such as hospitals.
On this basis, Cotterill (1987) formulated a theory of
cooperative prices, investment, and finance decisions
under risk, explaining the pricing mechanism in a situa-
tion in which cooperatives and investor-oriented firms
regionally coexist. In this situation, members of the coop-
erative can judge the fairness of investor-oriented firms’
pricing by comparing it to the cooperative’s internal pri-
cing mechanism. Because members are at the same time
firm owners, they do not have to satisfy shareholders and
will not accept prices beyond average cost. Over time
cooperative price information spills off into the public
domain and serves market actors as a yardstick.
Cooperative prices then become a disciplining factor for
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the prices comparable industries offer, thereby contribut-
ing to the price development of the overall economy.
Briefly put, “[in] the long run, cooperative price equals
average cost” (Cotterill 1987, 196).
Cotterill’s argument also works in the same manner
for the provision of inputs. In a situation where coopera-
tives exist to supply members with cheaper inputs, ceteris
paribus the presence of a cooperative enterprise will
lower regional input prices over time. Conversely, in
processing or retailing, the presence of cooperatives
would lead to higher producer prices, as also proposed
in LeVay’s (1983) Pacemaker Theory.
Furthermore, Cotterill (1987) points out that, besides
yardstick information spillovers, cooperative market
power has a strong impact on price setting. The stronger
the cooperative sector, the more prices head toward long-
term average costs, even in unregulated cooperative
monopolies, as competition between farmers and the
right to deliver ensure efficiency. Empirically, this should
result in higher farm gate prices for agricultural produce
as compared to markets with little market power for
farmers.
To our knowledge, the cooperative yardstick theory1
has not yet been tested empirically for European dairy
markets. Previous work on price variation and the role of
cooperatives has largely refrained from structural reason-
ing and, instead, has put farms as individual economic
agents in the center of analysis, seeking to explain price
differences from socio-economic heterogeneity and het-
erogeneity in transaction costs (cf. Cazzuffi 2012; Sauer,
Gorton, and White 2012). Such studies refer to the litera-
ture on price dispersion in industrial organization, where
the fact that “firms in the same market selling identical
goods for different prices (at the same time)” (Lewis
2008, 654) is subject to a large body of theoretical and
empirical work on firm-level retail price dispersion. The
only recent empirical study on the effect of cooperatives
on market structure and prices is Milford (2012), who
finds evidence for a pro-competitive effect of the number
of cooperatives within a regional market on prices farm-
ers receive.
3 Empirical approach and data
In the following, we develop a simple econometric model
in which prices paid to producers depend, among other
things, on the relative strength of cooperatives in an EU-
27 member state. According to our theoretical considera-
tions, an increase in the share of cooperatives would
raise producer prices through yardstick pricing, and
investor-oriented firms in the vicinity of cooperatives
may have to pay price premiums to attract customers.
For our analysis, we have used Eurostat panel data on
farm gate milk prices, maize fodder prices, per capita GDP,
and trade balances for the years 2000 to 2010 for the EU-27.
To reduce skewness, some of the variables were log-trans-
formed. The Eurostat data on milk and maize have already
been “quality-adjusted”, so that the “identical good
assumption” holds (Goldberg and Verboven 2004). The
variable MILKPRICE is calculated as a mean on the level of
a member state for one year for all milk delivered to dairies,
based on its actual fat content (Eurostat Code 12112000).
Super-levies are not part of the calculation, and bonuses
and refunds from dairies to farmers are taken into account.2
In addition, we use a unique data set on the market
share of cooperatives for the EU-27.3 These data are
derived from expert assessments found in country reports
within the Support for Farmer’s Cooperatives project of
the European Commission.4 The following Table 2 pro-
vides a brief description of the variables.
We have included prices of maize – a crucial input
into dairy farming – in the analysis to control for national
differences in fodder costs, because “[p]rice differences
due solely to local cost differences do not create a buy-
low-sell-high opportunity for arbitrageurs and so are fea-
sible even if markets are perfectly integrated internation-
ally” (Goldberg and Verboven 2004, 489). We have also
used GDP as a proxy for labor and capital intensity of
1 In the following, we use the terms “cooperative yardstick” or
“cooperative yardstick effect” for referring to the set of theoretical
contributions holding that cooperatives have a pro-competitive
effect on prices in markets with imperfect competition. Most com-
monly, the terms “competitive yardstick”, “competitive yardstick
effect”, or “competitive yardstick school of cooperative thought”
are used in the literature (cf. Fousekis 2011; Sexton 1990; Staatz
1989; Cotterill 1984, 1987). Some authors (e.g. Fowler 1948) have
also used the shorter “cooperative yardstick” when describing the
phenomenon with regard to agricultural or consumer cooperatives.
2 The variable was calculated the same way for all member states.
Additional information on calculation of this variable at the level of
member states is available in the Handbook for EU Agricultural Price
Statistics (Eurostat 2008). Summary statistics on variation across
states and years are available from the authors on request.
3 One drawback of our approach is that these data were available only
for 2010. We have thus implicitly assumed that the market share of
cooperatives has been historically determined and stable over time.
4 Within thisproject, a national report onagricultural cooperativeswas
written for each of the 27member states by academic experts. As part of
these reports, experts were asked to provide information on the market
shares of major agricultural sectors, including dairy, for 2010. Through
discussions within the project, it turned out that for two countries –
Belgium and the United Kingdom – the country experts provided very
low estimates. After checking these figures with respective national
cooperative umbrella organizations, they were subsequently corrected.
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agriculture. For countries with a positive trade balance,
our a priori assumption was that their potential competi-
tive advantage should be reflected in lower domestic
prices. We added dummy variables to control for new
member states and countries in Southern Europe, where
dairy farming is usually more difficult due to less
favorable agro-ecological conditions. Table 3 provides
summary statistics for the pooled data.
It can be seen that the average milk price during the
study period was roughly 30 Euros per 100 kg and that
the average share of cooperatives was about 55%. A more
detailed overview of the variation in market shares of
dairy cooperatives is provided in Figure 1.
As can be seen from Figure 1, variation in the national
market shares of cooperatives is relatively high, ranging
from only 10% in Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Romania, and Bulgaria up to almost 100% in Sweden. For
estimating the cooperative yardstick effect, we used static
panel data models. Fixed-effects models use differencing to
effectively control for all time-invariant variables at the cost
of efficiency. Random-effects models improve efficiency by
considering additional available information from time-
invariant data (cf. Greene 2011; Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal 2008). To decide which model to use, we applied
the commonly used Hausman specification test (1978) and,
in addition, followed the procedure suggested by Baltagi,
Bresson, and Pirotte (2003) to control for potential endo-
geneity bias of our main variable of interest.
4 Model results and robustness
checks
We estimate a static panel data model of the form
yit ¼ αþ β0xit þ η0zi þ uit ½1
Table 2 Description of study variables
Variable Description
MILKPRICE Farm gate price in Euro for 100 kg milk
LNMAIZEPRICE Natural logs of fodder maize price for 100 kg
LNGDP Natural logs of per capita GDP
TRADEBAL Percentage of imports/exports of total production
NEWMS Dummy ¼ 1 if country has joined European Union in
2004 or later
SOUTH Dummy ¼ 1 if country is located in the South of
Europe
COOPSHARE Turnover market share of cooperatives in dairy in %
Source: Own design.
Table 3 Summary statistics of pooled data
Obs. Mean SD Minimum Maximum
MILKPRICE 241 29.68 6.38 13.83 47.50
LNMAIZEPRICE 172 2.73 0.33 2.00 3.51
LNGDP 297 9.86 0.67 8.48 11.28
TRADEBAL 210 −0.01 0.04 −0.17 0.13
NEWMS 297 0.33 0.47 0 1
SOUTH 297 0.30 0.46 0 1
COOPSHARE 297 54.50 30.85 10.00 100.00
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat and Hanisch, Müller, and
Rommel (2011).
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Figure 1 Market shares of cooperatives in the EU-27
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where yit is the milk price for country i in year t; xit is
a vector of time-variant variables of maize prices, GDP,
and trade balance; zi is a vector of time-invariant vari-
ables on the market share of cooperatives, dummy vari-
ables on new member state status, and location in the
South of the European Union; α; β0; and η0 are coefficients
to be estimated; and uit is an error term. Assuming exo-
geneity of all regressors and no systematic differences in
coefficients with the within-group (fixed-effects) estima-
tor, the random-effects estimator yields efficient and con-
sistent estimates of the model.
Table 4 presents four specifications of fixed- and
random-effects models. In the fixed-effects models, the
(within-group) estimator eliminates η0zi through using
differences. The first two specifications include all vari-
ables; models 3 and 4 remove the maize price to increase
the number of observations, which consequently
increases the number of member states entering the ana-
lysis from 16 to 23.
Coefficients do not differ substantially between the
first models, suggesting that the random-effects estimator
produces unbiased estimates. A Hausman test does not
reject the null hypothesis of no systematic differences in
coefficients (χ2 ¼ 0.16; p ¼ 0.9845). Differences in coef-
ficients are somewhat higher between models 3 and 4;
yet, also here a Hausman test suggests using the more
efficient random-effects model (χ2 ¼ 3.76; p ¼ 0.1523).
Differences between the first two columns and the last
two columns arise from selection effects due to the una-
vailability of maize price data for several member states.
Models 3 and 4 include seven more countries in which
maize is typically not grown or for which the data are not
available, namely Sweden, Poland, Malta, Latvia, Italy,
Ireland, Finland, and Estonia. It can be concluded, how-
ever, that in both samples including time-invariant vari-
ables and using the random-effects model can be
justified. To explore the relationship between the market
share of cooperatives and milk prices, a natural step was
to investigate the data graphically. Figure 2 plots the
market share of cooperatives in 2010 against the average
farm gate milk price over the study period for all 23 states
for which these data were available.
Figure 2 suggests a positive relationship between the
strength of cooperatives and average milk price – very
much in favor of a cooperative yardstick effect. We now
look at this relationship in greater detail by estimating six
specifications of random-effects and pooled regression
models. The results are presented in Table 5.
The first two models include all variables; models 3
and 4 are reduced by the maize data; models 5 and 6 are
also reduced by the trade balance, for which there were
also many missing observations. Coefficients vary across
models for most variables, but drastic changes are rare
and only one time does a coefficient change its sign
(NEWMS becomes positive in model 6).
All coefficients show the expected signs. Dairy prices
increase with increasing maize prices; prices are higher in
countries of the South and lower in the new member
states. As one would expect, prices are also lower in
exporting countries and higher in countries with a high
GDP, which we can also interpret as a proxy for off-farm
income opportunity costs.
Estimates for the COOPSHARE variable are relatively
robust across different specifications, indicating that the
Table 4 Regression results for time-variant variables
Model 1 (fixed effects) Model 2 (random effects) Model 3 (fixed effects) Model 4 (random effects)
LNMAIZEPRICE 6.3220*** 6.0694***
(1.6770) (1.3740)
LNGDP 3.2128 3.4508*** 7.6821*** 5.6823***
(2.6218) (1.1176) (1.5906) (1.0265)
TRADEBAL –3.5234 –4.0928 –3.7752 –10.2606
(9.4586) (8.2278) (9.0195) (8.3368)
Constant –19.2984 –21.3963** –45.6682*** –25.9820**
(23.7834) (10.2427) (15.7375) (10.1408)
N 104 104 172 172
χ2 48.5157*** 33.3500***
Groups 16 16 23 23
Overall R2 0.4825 0.4831 0.2150 0.2310
F 10.9235*** 13.0507***
Source: Eurostat; Hanisch, Müller, and Rommel (2011); own calculations.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01.
156 M. Hanisch et al.: Yardstick Effect of Cooperatives in European Dairy Farming
size of the cooperative yardstick effect is not very sensi-
tive to changes in sample or variables and remains rela-
tively stable under a range of specifications. The smallest
estimated coefficient is 0.0250 in model 2, as compared to
the high estimate of 0.0443 in model 4. Using 0.0250 as a
conservative estimate suggests that a one percent
increase in the market share of cooperatives leads to a
rise in farm gate milk price of 2.5 Euro cents. For a
country like Germany, where cooperatives control
roughly two thirds of the market, this means that about
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Figure 2 Cooperative market share vs. average milk price 2000–2010
Table 5 Regression results for all variables
Model 1
(pooled)
Model 2
(random effects)
Model 3
(pooled)
Model 4
(random effects)
Model 5
(pooled)
Model 6
(random effects)
LNMAIZEPRICE 3.9369*** 6.4254***
(1.4073) (1.5445)
LNGDP 2.4365** 2.8285* 3.0476*** 5.6053*** 4.1068*** 7.0595***
(0.9578) (1.5840) (0.8258) (1.3274) (0.5999) (0.7803)
TRADEBAL −0.2175** −0.0880 −0.2699*** −0.1579
(0.0973) (0.1037) (0.0785) (0.0982)
SOUTH 2.7542** 1.8641 5.3693*** 6.1942*** 5.8416*** 7.3864***
(1.0598) (1.9199) (0.8793) (1.7222) (0.6962) (1.6858)
NEWMS −4.0681*** −2.5522 −3.3374** −0.0407 −2.4616** 1.2930
(1.5095) (2.8617) (1.3666) (2.4683) (1.0157) (2.0117)
COOPSHARE 0.0417** 0.0250 0.0438*** 0.0443* 0.0440*** 0.0369
(0.0200) (0.0345) (0.0127) (0.0263) (0.0099) (0.0260)
Constant −7.2927 −17.1404 −3.4373 −29.4178** −14.0445** −43.8919***
(8.7243) (15.0847) (8.5290) (13.7158) (6.1286) (8.1782)
N 91 91 154 154 241 241
χ2 59.1656 59.6145 128.1768
Adj. R2 0.6141 0.5550 0.6057
Groups 15.0000 22.0000 23.0000
Overall R2 0.6121 0.5320 0.5845
F 24.8715 39.1577 93.1698
Source: Eurostat; Hanisch, Müller, and Rommel (2011); own calculations.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
M. Hanisch et al.: Yardstick Effect of Cooperatives in European Dairy Farming 157
1.66 Euros of an assumed farm gate milk price of 25
Euros/100 kg – that is, 6.7% – can be attributed to the
existence of cooperatives. Note that these estimates are
rather conservative and that the cooperative yardstick
effect would be substantially higher for a coefficient of
about 0.04.
The estimates of η0 may suffer from bias if there are
country-specific factors that cause the market share of
cooperatives. A potential way to overcome such bias
would be to implement the Hausman–Taylor estimator
(Hausman and Taylor 1981), which would require exo-
genous instruments to substitute COOPSHARE.
Unfortunately, our limited data did not include instru-
mental variables (IV) which would have been good
enough to provide reliable estimates of the respective IV
estimator. Available instruments (GDP, NEWMS, and
SOUTH) were not sufficiently correlated with the poten-
tially endogenous variable and the resulting Hausman–
Taylor estimates suffered from small-sample and weak-
instrument bias: a commonly known problem of IV esti-
mators (Verbeek 2004, 147). It is likely that a country’s
legal framework – for instance differences in taxation of
cooperatives – would influence the strength of the coop-
erative sector. However, a recent large-scale research
project did not find support for such an impact in the
EU-27 (Bijman et al. 2012). In other words, even if data on
the legal framework were available, they most probably
would not have reduced the problem of weak instru-
ments. Summing up, the presented random-effects esti-
mates are the best the available data allow. However, the
issue of potential endogeneity should be kept in mind.
In the end, we cannot rule out that the effect of
COOPSHARE on milk prices is driven by other time-invar-
iant country-specific effects. As it stands now, our
approach here cannot disentangle the two. A country’s
cooperative or competition laws, or even its culture,
could all drive cooperative strength and, hence, milk
prices. In future work, these limitations could be over-
come in three ways. Firstly, more and stronger instru-
ments at the country level may be used to substitute for
COOPSHARE. Weak-instrument and small-sample bias
may nonetheless prevail, however. Secondly, and per-
haps more promising, time-variant data on cooperative
strength, for instance yearly variation in market shares of
cooperative dairies according to country, would enable
identification of presently unobserved effects.
Regrettably, such data are currently unavailable for the
European dairy sector. This may be different in other
sectors or other parts of the world. Thirdly, one may
look at variation of cooperative strength within regions
of a country. This would eliminate potentially important
country-specific effects, such as the legal system. On the
other hand, cultural particularities of a region may still
be found to drive membership and strength at the regio-
nal level.
Farm gate prices could also be driven by the level of
value addition in the sector. If member states with higher
market shares of cooperatives are also dominated by
higher value products, it could be that higher prices are
a result of value addition and not of cooperatives as such.
In spite of this, on the national level, for instance in
Germany, often the opposite is argued: As a consequence
of bulk orientation and a lack of brand orientation, coop-
eratives are often accused of realizing less value addition
as compared to investor-oriented firms (Schramm, Spiller,
and Staack 2005). Sometimes, the ratio of turnover
derived from dairy products by processed amounts of
milk is used as an indicator of value addition
(Fahlbusch et al. 2009, 41). Such data were unfortunately
not available for the entire study period for EU-27 mem-
ber states, though the Eurostat data did include turnover
for the dairy processing industry for 2008. The following
Table 6 presents these data, milk output, a value addition
index as the ratio of turnover by output, farm gate milk
prices, and cooperative market shares by member states.
At least for 2008, the index of value addition does
not seem to be correlated with the market share of coop-
eratives. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.0153 and
is not statistically significantly different from zero (p ¼
0.9460). Given this relatively small sample, we cannot
fully rule out that such correlation exists for other years
of the study period or other sub-samples. However, at
this stage, we do not find strong support for a price effect
driven by value addition.
5 Discussion
The extent to which dairy sectors are cooperatively orga-
nized widely differs among member states of the
European Union. In some cases, farmers have criticized
the growth and professionalization strategies of their
cooperatives. With dairy farming being hardly profitable
in many parts of Europe, even a small yardstick effect
could make a difference to farmers. We find that coop-
eratives can best play their roles if they possess a relevant
(aggregate) market position. Figures about rapid concen-
tration in the sector, together with the limited role other
types of producer organizations play in the dairy sector,
underpin this claim. EU policy makers have argued that
strengthening the role of new bargaining cooperatives or
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producer organizations may improve the situation for
dairy producers. In our view, producers have to decide
the extent and type of organization they want to control.
In any case, large shares of the market will have to be
organized. As long as producers are still the legal owners
of dairy cooperatives which control 57% of the European
market, it seems reasonable to assume that investments
in the internal control and management of their coopera-
tive may achieve better results than investments in the
organization of new bargaining groups. More recent
trends toward growth and concentration, organization
in holding structures, or international acquisitions, may,
however, partly divert interest alignment between farm-
ers and cooperative managers. Eventually, this may even
erode the cooperative yardstick effect. These concerns
give further credibility to the importance of research on
the role of internal governance in agricultural
cooperatives.
In the past, quota limits may have reduced the
amounts of surplus milk and overall quality of milk
processed by dairies, particularly so in countries with
high quota rents such as Denmark or the Netherlands.
Consequently, quotas have been very influential in shap-
ing the institutional environment for milk producers and
dairies. The abolition of quotas, reduced price interven-
tion, and expected future increases in production may
result in heavy price fluctuations similar to those
observed in the past few years. In this situation, it is
important to understand both the nature of milk produ-
cing firms and their processors. Our findings suggest that
an alternative policy option may be to support coopera-
tives for their positive effects on price. Initial results also
point toward a positive effect of cooperatives on price
stabilization (Hanisch et al. 2012). Exemptions from
bundling restrictions are one possible way to ensure
that cooperatives can achieve large market shares.
Farmers may have to accept that this comes at the cost
of larger, increasingly internationally-oriented and pro-
fessionalized cooperatives, which is usually accompanied
by the transformation of internal governance models.
Table 6 Value addition and industry turnover statistics by member states
Country Milk production
in 1,000 tons in 2008
Industry turnover
in million Euro in 2008
Index of value addition
turnover/milk
produced in Euro/kg
Farm gate milk
price in Euro/100 kg
in 2008
Market share
cooperatives
in % in 2010
AT 2,705 1,987.9 0.7349 38.9 95
BE 2,849 4,238.8 1.4878 32.12 66
BG 681 330.0 0.4846 . 10
CY 150 197.3 1.3153 . 10
CZ 2,433 1,634.5 0.6718 . 66
DE 27,466 23,889.8 0.8698 35.01 65
DK 4,586 . . 37.82 94
EE 606 307.0 0.5066 29.67 35.1
ES 5,849 10,305.2 1.7619 37.94 40
FI 2,254 2,051.2 0.9100 43.49 97
FR 23,815 25,098.5 1.0539 . 55
GR 690 . . 43.2 35
HU 1,425 916.6 0.6432 32.81 30.8
IE 5,090 3,172.0 0.6232 31.25 99
IT 10,489 15,233.9 1.4524 41.47 42
LT 1,382 822.0 0.5948 . 10
LU 265 . . 38.13 10
LV 635 324.4 0.5109 24.96 33
MT . . . 47.5 91
NL 10,936 8,913.1 0.8150 36.35 80
PL 9,112 5,464.5 0.5997 29.12 72
PT 1,890 1,679.2 0.8885 36.22 70
RO 1,053 816.0 0.7749 23.93 10
SE 2,955 2,279.1 0.7713 37.23 100
SI 524 . . 32.79 80
SK 946 516.1 0.5456 34.13 24.5
UK 13,350 8,497.1 0.6365 31.62 50
Source: Eurostat (2012); Hanisch, Müller, and Rommel (2011); own calculations.
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Ensuring that cooperatives can grow while still acting in
the interests of their farmer-owners is a challenge that
should not be underestimated in this regard.
6 Conclusions and outlook
In this article, we have conducted a panel-data analysis
to estimate the yardstick pricing effect of cooperatives in
European dairy farming. Our results show that this effect
exists, it is relatively large, and it is fairly robust regard-
ing sample and variable selection. A drawback, however,
is the limited data we needed to rely on, which do not
allow us to distinguish the effect of cooperative strength
on milk prices from other country-specific effects.
Keeping this limitation in mind, the findings, at this
stage, are in line with theoretical predictions from the
literature.
Ironically, the yardstick effect is observed on the
level of national markets, implying that all farmers, not
only farmer-members, benefit from the pro-competitive
effect of cooperatives. A recently carried out analysis of
pricing behavior on the level of processors even suggests
that, in some regions, members of cooperatives receive
somewhat lower prices (Hanisch, Müller, and Rommel
2011), because competing dairy processors had to pay
price premiums. To look at the pricing behavior of coop-
eratives and individual enterprises nested within national
market structures in greater detail would, thus, be an
important task for future research. It would, we believe,
also be worthwhile to explore the temporal dynamics of
yardstick pricing. Over the last decade or so, farmer
complaints about prices received for their produce have
also increased vis-à-vis cooperatives. It would be inter-
esting to see whether recent professionalization, growth,
and changes in internal governance have also had an
effect on yardstick pricing. Are there expectable price
declines in countries like Denmark, Germany, or the
Netherlands, which are characterized by very large
multi-billion Euro cooperatives? Further analysis may
also focus on other aspects of market structure, such as
price volatility, or extend the analysis to different sectors.
Different sectors may show various levels of market inte-
gration and transportation costs, and it would be inter-
esting to see whether such differences are also reflected
in the yardstick effect of cooperatives.
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